A short essay on the emergence of a new type of intentionality

Generally, for classical phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, intentionality means the ability of a person to direct towards an object outside one’s own mind. Phenomenologists have been studying the properties of intentionality since the 20th century. It is an inseparable part of human consciousness and, with the development of technology, can acquire a new form. For example, pictorial act. This is a change that arises only with the development of painting and photography.

One can ask so many interesting and relevant questions about this: what role do old intentionalities play in the emergence of new intentionalities? How can the new type of intentionality be defined? Is the new type really a unique type, or is it being confused with experiences of the old type but with more peculiarities? How is the process of the emergence of new intentionalities?

These questions are especially relevant in the era of rapidly developing technology. Unfortunately, the author was unable to find research works that provide systematic answers to these questions. Therefore, this essay will write down thoughts and hypotheses about the questions raised.

First, since the perceptual act is the most fundamental type of intentionality, one can consider the possibility that the very difference between types is grounded in perceptuality. For example, the very act of feeling the difference between the mind's perceptual act and an imaginative act is itself a perceptual act. Thus, the concept of imagination itself is grounded in empirical content. Then how does a person's perception of the difference between reality and imagination differ from their perception of the difference between water and juice? How is imagination a unique type of intentionality, while juice is not? Of course, imagination and picture actually have its own structural peculiarities. However, in reality, should they be given the status of a unique type of intentionality? Is "looking out through a window" a new intentionality? When a

person directs themself to the external environment through a “window”, the person-environment dyad does not function normally: the person is drawn out of the environment they are looking at, and only remains connected to that environment visually. Moreover, in order for an intentional act to be considered a new type, its old types must be identified. From which acts, when deviated, can it be said that it has become a new type? It seems a system of differences can be observed here.

Second, one can imagine a New Guinean person who has never encountered a picture. When that person sees a picture of themself, what change occurs in his consciousness? From the perspective of classical phenomenology, after that person sees the photograph, there should arise in him an intentional act called pictorial act. Isn’t such a new structure a change independent of other intentionalities, which has arisen as a reaction to a person encountering a new type of phenomenon? Not only intentionality. In this case, what are the elements doing that have not entered realm of intentionality but enter into the person’s meaningful context?

Perhaps the new acts are a complex structure made from existing acts such as the perceptual act, the imaginative act, and so on. In fact, answering these questions is difficult.

In conclusion, intentionality is an inseparable part of human consciousness. The questions raised by the emergence of its new forms are important, especially in an era of frequent change.